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 What are we learning from the life satisfaction 
literature? 
 
Leonardo Becchetti (*), Alessandra Pelloni (*) 
 
Abstract 
The recent availability of cross-sectional and longitudinal survey data on life satisfaction in a 
large number of countries gives us the opportunity to verify empirically (and not just to assume) 
what matters for individuals and what economists and policymakers should take into account 
when trying to promote  personal and societal wellbeing. The wide array of econometric findings 
available  in  this  booming  literature  display  evidence,  generally  robust  to  different  cultural 
backgrounds,  on  the  effects  of  some  important  happiness  drivers  (income,  unemployment, 
marital status) which can be co
∗nsidered “quasi stylized facts” of happiness. If economic policies, 
for  many  obvious  reasons,  cannot  maximize  self  declared  life  satisfaction  as  such,  we  are 
nonetheless learning a lot from these contributions. In particular, results on the relevance and 
the risk of crowding out of relational goods, on the revisited inflation/unemployment trade off 
and, more in general, on the measurement of the shadow value of non market goods obtained 
with life satisfaction estimates, are conveying relevant information about individual preferences 
and what is behind utility functions. Such findings suggest us to move beyond anthropological 
reductionism toward behavioral complexity and to refocus target indicators of economic policies 
in order to minimize the distance between economic development and human wellbeing. 
 
Keywords: life satisfaction, shadow value of non market goods, unemployment/inflation 
trade-off. 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
Even when happiness data were not available, the interest of economists, since the classics, 
extended  beyond  unemployment,  output  growth  and  stability  to  more  general  and 
philosophical questions on life satisfaction and its drivers. 
In  a  famous  and  often  quoted  sentence  Malthus  (1798)  says  when  commenting  Adam 
Smith‘s Wealth of nations that (1798): “The professed object of Dr. Adam Smith’s inquiry is the 
nature and the causes of the wealth of nations. There is another inquiry, however, perhaps still more 
interesting, which he occasionally mixes with it, I mean an inquiry into the causes which affect the 
happiness of nations”. The value of the investigation on the wealth-happiness nexus was 
also  recognised,  among  others,  by  Malthus  (1798),  Marshall  (1890),  Veblen  (1899)  and, 
more recently, Dusenberry (1949) and Hirsch (1976). 
However, until more recent times, in absence of the ample and multi-country empirical 
data we have now, the debate remained confined within the realm of philosophy and 
history  of  economic  thought  and  the  famous  say  of  Einstein  that  “things  that  matter 
cannot  be  measured”  could  be  well  applied  to  the  case.  As  in  the  famous  joke  about 
economists, evidence on the determinants of happiness and life satisfaction was in the 
shadow and out of the street light since the latter made possible to carry on empirical 
research only on a very limited range of issues for which theoretical hypotheses could be 
tested and such issues did not include determinants of happiness. 
The  shortcut  generally  adopted  by  economists,  standard  in  mainstream  economic 
textbooks and most theoretical models, was that the utility function and its arguments 
were an exhaustive, non testable, description of human desires and ambitions or at least of 
those related to the field of study of economics under the maintained assumption that 
desires and aspirations which were out the research scope where not affected or were not 
relevant to the analysis. This simplification introduced a dichotomy between the various 
parts  of  the  same  integrated  human  being  who  was  assumed  to  behave  according  to 
different  rules  when  homo  oeconomicus,  homo  politicus  or  homo  domesticus  in  primary 
relationships such as family or community ties, were in action. 
In  this  perspective  the  progressive  availability  of  information  about  individual  life 
satisfaction from surveys1 has stimulated researchers curiosity and progressively allowed 
to test the assumptions on which economic thinking was based. 
When life satisfaction data became available, the first descriptive provocation challenging 
the tenet of the non divergence between economic growth and happiness was provided by 
the so called Easterlin‘s paradox (1974) with a simple descriptive statistics showing the 
non  convergence  between  a  steadily  increasing  per  capita  income  and  a  stationary  or 
slightly decreasing share of (self declared) “very happy” individuals in the post II world 
war period in the US. 
The  paradox  stimulated  the  debate  and  the  interest  in  the  field  and  explains  why  the 
relationship between income and happiness is the most debated issue. 
 
                                                           
1 Among these databases the most important having information covering a large number of countries and years are the 
World Value Survey, the World Poll of the Gallup organization; the Eurobarometer and the European Household 
Survey. On the other side, we have several panel databases available which contain longitudinal information on self 
declared happiness (British Household Survey Panel, German Socioeconomic Panel, and Russia Monitoring Survey) 
although they have it for a single country. 3 
 
Beyond it, what is more surprising in these studies is the remarkable robustness of some 
basic  results  confirmed  under  different  samples,  estimation  periods  and  cultural 
backgrounds: in spite of the same semantic heterogeneity of the concept of happiness,2 of 
the  different  cultural  backgrounds  affecting  the  way  individuals  answer  to  these 
questions,  we  observe  almost  everywhere  the  same  impact  of  income,  health,  wealth, 
unemployment and marital status. 
The goal of this synthetic survey on these studies is that of illustrating such findings and 
the methodological problems which arise in the field. 
The paper is divided into six sections. In the second section we start from the Easterlin‘s 
paradox and investigate whether it is valid or not also in other countries and periods. 
Beyond it, by discussing the econometric evidence on the issue, we document that the 
relationship  between  happiness  and  life  satisfaction  is  much  more  complex  than  what 
assumed by both the paradox an the textbook utility function. 
In essence,  while evidence on the instantaneous nexus between income and happiness 
does  not  lead  to  reject  the  assumption  of  a  concave  relationship  between  utility  and 
income, usually postulated in theoretical models, several factors complicate the picture in 
the  medium  run.  Among  them  the  most  relevant  are  hedonic  adaptation  and  relative 
income effects by which comparisons with oneself in the past and with others alter the 
short  run  satisfaction  we  derive  from  material  achievements.  In  spite  of  it,  it  must  be 
however said that, when higher personal income is also a proxy of high domestic income 
and public wealth, and contribute to improve quality and availability of domestic public 
goods (especially health and education) we have a clear cut positive indirect impact of 
income on life satisfaction. Borrowing the well known concept of Sen (1999) income does 
have straightforward and undiscussed positive effects on life flourishing when it enhances 
individual  capabilities  which,  in  turn,  depend  by  both  personal  prosperity,  quality  of 
institutions and public wealth.3 
In the third section we discuss the relationship between happiness and sociability finding 
that the quality of social relationships is a crucial driver of life satisfaction. We also discuss 
the novel concept of relational goods and illustrate the coordination failures which have 
led  to  deplete  progressively  the  stock  of  such  goods  in  high  income  societies.  The 
mechanism  is  similar  to  the  well  known  Baumol‘s  disease.  Relational  goods,  like 
performing arts, do not get benefit from technological innovation as it occurs for most 
traditional  goods  since  the  time  needed  to  produce  them  cannot  be  compressed.  As  a 
consequence their relative cost gets higher and higher and the opportunity cost of the time 
invested in relationships grows. Higher opportunity costs do not depend only by the fact 
that individuals are more productive but also by the competition of an increasingly wider 
range of non relational leisure (i.e. solo TV watching and internet navigation) activities 
with time invested in relational goods. 
The following parts of the third section look at the relationship between life satisfaction 
and other important drivers such as education, marital status and children.  
                                                           
2 The world happiness has nuances which vary according to different languages. In Anglo-Saxon languages is more akin 
to a concept in which happiness is fruit of chance (the English word happiness has its root in the verb “to happen” and 
gluck (happiness in German) is close in meaning to luck). The meaning is still different in French (bonheur) and Italian 
(felicità) where it is more akin to a concept of personal responsibility, cultivation of virtues and life flourishing. 
3 For the development of the concept of capabilities see Sen (1985a and 1985b). As it is well known 
capabilities are defined in Sen (1999) as “the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for a 
person to achieve” (p.75) and, in turn, functionings as “various things a person may value being or doing.”‖ 
(p.75). 4 
 
In section 4.1 we discuss some crucial methodological issues related to happiness studies. 
More specifically, we analyse the two alternative approaches (econometric estimates on 
the  overall  self  declared  life  satisfaction  vis  à  vis  the  momentary  affect  approach)  and 
tackle issues such as the relationship between life satisfaction and utility, problems related 
to the cardinality/ordinality assumption and the heterogeneity of life satisfaction scales 
across individuals and across different cultural backgrounds. 
In section 4.2 we document how life satisfaction evidence has been used to calculate the 
shadow value of non market goods, while in section 4.3 we discuss the specific literature 
which uses happiness scores to recalculate the unemployment-inflation trade-off.  
Finally, in section 5 we discuss the consequences in terms of policy and policy indicators 
of what we learned from the life satisfaction literature. Without going to the opposite (and 
dangerous)  extreme  of  using  directly  life  satisfaction  scores  as  wellbeing  indicators, 
empirical results in this literature are very helpful to understand what is missed when 
relying solely on GDP indicators and how a more sophisticated evaluation of wellbeing 
can be drawn which takes into account complex interrelations between monetary and non 
monetary drivers of life satisfaction. Section six concludes. 
  
2. The Easterlin’s paradox and the relationship between income and happiness  
  
The  sections  which  follow  will  discuss  whether  the  paradox  is  confirmed  in  different 
countries and periods and interpret it in the light of the complex relationship between 
income and happiness which include, together with standard economic effect, sociological 
(comparisons with peers) and psychological (hedonic adaptation) effects. 
  
2.1 Is the paradox confirmed in other countries and periods? 
  
The  symbolic  importance  of  the  Easterlin‘s  paradox  (even  in  the  limit  of  its  simple 
descriptive  evidence)  is  that  it  confutes  the  maintained  assumption  of  many  economic 
analyses  that,  by  pursuing  economic  growth,  we  are  also  increasing  personal  life 
satisfaction.  
Even though the paradox illustrates per se an important phenomenon in the US post II 
World War period, several authors wondered whether the same result could be found in 
different countries and periods. With this respect we may resume findings of inquiries on 
this point by saying that: i) the paradox is confirmed in many other high income countries 
but ii) not in all of them; iii) in spite of the paradox the difference in average happiness 
levels in high and low income countries is generally positive and strong.4 
 
More specifically, the paradox is confirmed by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) showing 
that, in spite of a steadily increasing standard of living, in the period going from the early 
1970s  to  the  late  1990s,  average  self  declared  happiness  remained  constant  or  even 
                                                           
4 An interesting exception is in the comparison between average happiness levels of Mexican and US citizens 
from the World Value Survey data with the former being on average slightly happier than the latter. A part 
from the methodological difficulties in comparing self declared life satisfaction among different cultures (see 
section 4) this finding is not inconsistent, as it may seem to be, with the flow of Mexicans moving to the US. 
Actually the ―vote with feet‖ of unhappy Mexicans can be part of a sorting and matching process by which 
those Mexicans for which money matters more move to the US thereby leaving in their countries citizens 
with are happier with a lower level of income. 5 
 
declined not only in the United States but also in Great Britain, Belgium and Japan. Similar 
results are obtained by Veenhoven (1993) in Japan over the period 1958-1987 and Frey and 
Stutzer (2002b) on a large sample of countries using data from the World Database of 
Happiness and the U.S. Bureau of Census. 
By  contrast,  Diener  and  Oishi  (2000)  document  the  association  between  high  real  per-
capita  growth  rates  and  (small)  increases  in  self-reported  happiness  in  countries  like 
Denmark, Germany and Italy during the ‘60s and ‘70s. In the same direction Castriota 
(2006) observes that the paradox does not apply to Italy when using Eurobarometer data 
for last decade.  
More  recently,  the  paradox  has  been  questioned  by  Stevenson  and  Wolfers  (2008) 
documenting the positive and significant relationship between income and life satisfaction 
after controlling for many concurring factors. The authors devise a two stage approach. In 
the first stage they regress on time trends both life satisfaction and per capita income data 
separately for each country having long time series for these two variables. In the second 
stage they look at the correlation between combinations of points generated by country 
pairs of trend coefficients for the two variables on the considered number of countries 
finding the above mentioned positive result. In a reply to them Easterlin and Angelescu 
(2009) show that, if country pairs of income and happiness trend slope coefficients have a 
minimum  of  8  years  (to  ensure  that  what  we  are  observing  are  long  run  effects),  the 
paradox  emerges  again  and  income  per  capita  is  again  not  significant.  Bartolini  et  al. 
(2010)  show  with  the  same  approach  that  the  regressor  becomes  highly  positive  and 
significant if we replace income per capita with a measure of social capital, (proxied by the 
only variable available for so long time periods, that is, the share of individuals having at 
least  one  membership  in  various  country  associations  and  organisations).  The  querelle 
demonstrates that the same data can be viewed from different angles leading to different 
conclusions even though the simple descriptive evidence of the paradox remains there and 
requires some interpretation. An attempt is provided in the next section. 
 
2.2 The interpretation of the paradox 
  
It is important to clarify what the Easterlin‘s paradox says and what it does not say. The 
paradox does not establish per se a statistically significant (and negative) nexus between 
happiness and per capita income or a causality nexus between stagnation of happiness 
and  per  capita  income  growth.  Neither  it  can  exclude  that  a  significant  and  positive 
relationship  between  income  and  happiness  exists  after  controlling  for  all  relevant 
variables excluded from the picture. Furthermore, it is an aggregate long run association 
between two variables which is far from verifying the effect of changes in income on (short 
run) changes in happiness at individual level (a question we will discuss below). What it 
however undoubtedly says is that per capita income is not a reliable synthetic proxy of life 
satisfaction in the countries in which the paradox holds, or that, economists and politicians 
may be misled if they believe that by increasing per capita income they also automatically 
raise life satisfaction of their citizens and electors.  
 
As a consequence, even without more sophisticated investigation, the paradox suggests 
that a richer set of indicators has to be used in order to evaluate country wellbeing.  
To go deeper into this point consider the comparison between US (where the paradox 
applies) and Italy (where the paradox does not apply).  6 
 
In the US per capita income growth in the post world war II period is accompanied by a 
rising  household  debt  (De  Bonis  et  al.  2007)  and  increasing  inequality  (Wilkinson  and 
Pickett, 2009). In the more “parsimonious” Italy saving rates and wealth to income ratios 
are higher and debt to income ratio far lower than in the US. Health and education are free 
for large part of the population in Italy and a higher stake of pension rights is not affected 
by stock market volatility. Exactly as financial analysts do not look only at net sales in 
corporate  accounts,  but  also  at  the  dynamics  of  stocks  such  as  debt  and  total  assets, 
economic wellbeing of individuals does not depend only on per capita income but also on 
the level and volatility of their wealth, the cost of public goods and the level of debt.  
If per capita income in the US has risen significantly in the post world war II period, the 
per  capita  flow  of  money  available  after  paying  debt  interests,  health  insurance  and 
education for a large share of the population may have not risen much. In addition to it 
higher  income  inequality  may  have  reduced  life  satisfaction  when  comparing  material 
achievements with the average ones of the peers (see section 2.4). This may explain why 
life satisfaction stagnated or even declined in the second period of the time interval under 
scrutiny.5 
 A  conclusion  from  this  evidence  is  that  GDP  is  not  a  comprehensive  indicator  of  life 
satisfaction since it is not even a comprehensive indicator of economic wellbeing. 
  
Beyond the problem of the poverty of economic indicators there are many other potential 
explanations of the paradox different from the intuitive one that “money does not make 
happiness”. This is all the more so if we consider that evidence from some high income 
countries and on the difference in happiness between high and low income countries is in 
contradiction with such simplistic interpretation. The descriptive evidence under scrutiny 
may tell us that: i) per capita income has diminishing returns on happiness; ii) different 
levels of inequality may explain why the paradox works in some high income countries 
and not in others; iiii) short term positive effects of income on happiness may disappear in 
the long run due to hedonic adaptation; iv) increases in per capita income crowds out 
other factors (such as relational goods) which are important drivers of life satisfaction. The 
last  point  arises  because  growth  in  per  capita  income  raises  the  opportunity  cost  of 
investing in relational life (see section 3). Such problem cannot be solved by the individual 
with  simple  substitution/income  effects  since  relational  life  is  a  local  public  good  on 
which  coordinated  investment  by  all  participants  to  the  relationship  is  required.  The 
consequence is the creation of coordination paradoxes and the decline or crowding out of 
relational life which is well documented for the US by Putnam (2000) and Bartolini et al. 
(2009)  
In what follows we will go deeper in the other four potential explanations of the Easterlin 




                                                           
5 From a methodological point of view it must be rejected the objection that the unit measures of the two 
variables are far different and that the discrete qualitative measure of happiness has an upper bound. The 
point does not matter since, in the Easterlin‘s analysis we are far from that upper bound (the share of very 
happy people is around 20 percent of the population). The more general problems related to measuring life 
satisfaction and happiness (cardinality/ordinality of the measure, heterogeneity in life satisfaction scales 





2.3 Happiness and income 
 
The three characteristics of money (unit count, reserve of value and medium of exchange) 
led  classical  economists  to  formulate  the  hypothesis  of  nonsatiation  and  decreasing 
marginal utility6  in the relationship between income and utility. 
The  hypothesis  stems  from  the  three  above  mentioned  functions  of  money  and,  in 
particular, from the fact that it is a mean of exchange which can be used to purchase an 
ample variety of material or immaterial goods (some among the latter, such as visibility 
and social recognition, may be extremely expensive and are probably what financiers of 
popular sport teams buy when becoming owner of the club). Hence, its marginal utility 
should keep on being positive, even when individuals possess large amount of it.  
Empirical analyses on the relationship between income and life satisfaction confirm that 
classical economists were right if we look at the instantaneous utility function for a single 
individual but not when we consider the impact of relative income and the change across 
time of the function due to hedonic adaptation. However concavity and nonsatiation fit 
quite well the cross-sectional distribution of per capita income and life satisfaction levels 
of world countries (see Frey and Stutzer 2002b). This implies that, at low per capita income 
levels,  small  improvements  make  a  strong  difference  in  terms  of  average  country  life 
satisfaction while, at high income levels, the same changes have negligible impact. Even 
though the comparison of happiness levels among different countries is subject to cultural 
bias and ethimological heterogeneity in the same definition of happiness across cultures, 
such a strong and expected regularity seem to indicate that the biases are not so relevant.  
What is certain is that the positive (generally nonlinear) association between per capita 
income and life satisfaction exists and is robust (see, among others, Easterlin, 1995 and 
2000;  Frey  and  Stutzer,  2000;  Di  Tella,  Mc  Culloch  and  Oswald,  2000)  as  well  as  a 
relationship of the same sign between changes in income and changes in life satisfaction in 
panel data where researchers control for fixed effects, usually interpreted as time invariant 
inherited  individual  traits  (see,  among  others,  Winkelmann  and  Winkelmann,  1998; 
Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004a; Senik, 2004; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005 and Clark et al., 2006). 
In this framework the most relevant findings are those of papers which go beyond the 
detection  of  the  positive  nexus  and  try  to  solve  the  causality  problem  by  identifying 
exogenous changes in income such as tsunami related effects on income (Becchetti and 
Castriota, 2007), lottery wins (Gardner and Oswald, 2006b) or changes in real income in 
Russia and East Germany after transition and reunification (Frijters et al., 2004a, 2004b and 
2006).  All  of  them  find  a  significant  effect  impact  of  these  income  shocks  on  life 
satisfaction. 
Beyond these more general results it is however interesting to see that “money does not 
buy happiness” for a non negligible subset of individuals in high income countries which 
have  been  defined  as  “frustrated  achievers”  (Graham  and  Pettinato,  2002).  Frustrated 
achievers are individuals who experience nonpositive (or even negative) changes in life 
satisfaction in 
                                                           
6 The law of decreasing marginal utility was first formulated by Gossen (1854) and then adopted by the 




parallel  to  a  positive  change  in  real  personal  or  equivalised  household  income.  In  an 
empirical analysis  on GSOEP data  (168,626  observations for the period 1984-2004)  Becchetti 
and  Rossetti  (2009)  find  that  around  one  third  of  individual-year  changes  indicate  the 
presence of frustrated achievement. The  main factors associated with it are contemporary 
deterioration of health or failure of personal relationships. 
 
How to reconcile the robust nexus between income and happiness documented in this section 
with the Easterlin paradox ? Two are the main rationales. First, the positive nexus between 
first differences in income and life satisfaction is a short run effect which can, in principle, be 
reabsorbed in the long run (as it occurs in the lottery winners story of Gartner and Oswald) . 
Second, cross-sectional evidence on the positive nexus may simply illustrate a distributional 
effect by indicating that, within a given country, higher income is associated with higher life 
satisfaction and viceversa. This is not in contrast with the possibility that country growth 
does not generate significant increases in average life satisfaction. 




2.4 Relative income effects  
 
As ―social animals‖ in the Aristotelic sense human beings are deeply affected by comparisons 
with  their  peers.  Our  internal  psychological  mechanisms  are  such  that  we  often  use 
comparisons  to  praise  or  to  stimulate  ourselves.  In  order  to  do  so,  we  tend  to  compare 
ourselves with a demanding reference group when we want to give us a push, while we 
compare with a less demanding reference group when we want to bolster our self esteem. 
Based on these premises the relative income hypothesis argues that individuals do not look 
just at their own income but also compare it with the average income of their reference group.  
Competition with others may create ―treadmill effects‖ up to the extreme case of fully relative 
preferences where only relative and not absolute income matters. In such context an increase 
in personal income, paralleled by  an  equal increase  in income of all the reference group, 
would  not  affect  individual  life  satisfaction.  This  is  equivalent  as  saying  that,  with 
competition on income considered as a zero sum game, the dominance of the relative income 
effect may paradoxically eliminate any significant impact of a positive change in personal 
income (Dusenberry, 1949; Frank, 2005 and Layard, 2005). 
Beyond this extreme proposition, we however generally observe that absolute and relative 
effects  generally  coexist.  In  addition  to  it,  since  more  private  creation  of  economic  value 
normally translates into a higher tax inflow and more resources available for the provision of 
public goods, there  is a channel through which an increase  in absolute  income generates 
positive effects on happiness even if relative positions are unchanged (especially if it affects 
health, education and the cost of public goods and services).  
The  significance  of  relative  income  in  life  satisfaction  has  been  rigorously  tested  in 
econometric estimates (Dorn, Fischer, Kirchgassner and Sousa-Poza, 2007; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005). From a methodological point of view the measurement of the relative income effect is 




look at the robustness of the relative income to different reference groups which combine 
geographical location, gender, age cohorts and professional characteristics. Second, relative 
income is not uncorrelated with individual or household income and therefore collinearity 
problem may not help to measure accurately coefficient magnitudes. 
For these reasons it is important the importance of relative income comparisons is confirmed 
by  studies  looking  at  the  issue  from  a  different  perspective.  In  a  recent  experiment  with 
thousands  of  observations  from  eight  different  countries,  Corazzini  et  al.  (2010)  ask 
individuals to chose between a first case in which they are first in a group but have income 
which is lower  than in a second case in which they are the last of the group. The experiment 
shows  that  the preference  for being  first  even with a lower income is associated to male 
gender, higher education and residence  in a high income country. On the other hand, higher 
income of peers is not so negative, not only in low income countries but also in emerging 
countries.  
 
This last finding, if associated to those of Senik (2004) in transition countries, Jiang et al. 
(2009) in urban China and Becchetti and Savastano (2009) in Albania suggests that, for lower 
levels of income and high social mobility, a negative difference between one‘s own income 
and the income of peers may paradoxically translate into a positive and not negative effect on 
life satisfaction. The standard rationale which may explain this anomaly is the so called tunnel 
effect hypothesis (Hirschman, 1973): if an individual is stuck in a traffic jam and observes that 
after a while a car in the contiguous lane starts moving he may be happy for it since this is a 
signal that he is soon also starting to move.   
The important implication of these results is that higher social mobility raises the level of 
income  inequality  that  individuals  can  tolerate  or  that  ―American  dreams‖  have  a 
fundamental social role in compensating dissatisfaction of the less wealthy in highly unequal 
societies.   
 
Back to the main finding, the fact that individuals, especially in high income countries, may 
suffer if their reference group is better off suggests, more in general, that inequality may be 
harmful  for  happiness.  This  is  exactly  the  point  of  a  stimulating  book  of  Wilkinson  and 
Pickett (2009) showing, both across world countries and US states, an impressive correlation 
between domestic Gini coefficients and infant mortality, obesity, imprisonment, homicides, 
teenage births, mental illness and drug addiction. This evidence is purely descriptive and 
does not control for concurring factors or causality links (i.e. a country which is more open to 
immigrants may  ―import‖ higher levels of inequality and also  higher levels of the above 
mentioned  correlates  due  to  lack  of  integration  of  new  generations  of  immigrants).  It  is 
however an important stimulus for future research aiming at providing rationales for what 
observed in these data. 
 
If  most  of  the  relative  comparison  literature  refers  to  income  it  is  interesting  to  see  that 
relative values on variables different from income follow the same rules. 
The analysis of the effect of peer comparisons on variables different from income  shows that 
life satisfaction of obese individuals is significantly higher when also the partner is obese than 




much income and non income inequalities between partners explain separations or divorces.  
In another contribution (Clark,. 2008) it is shown that unemployment comparisons are so 
important to produce effects which are opposite to what we should expect from a purely 
economically rational point of view. More specifically, standard economic thinking suggests 
that individuals living in high unemployment areas should be less happy than those living in 
low unemployment areas since for the former will suffer from ―reservation army‖ effects in 
the Marxian sense and more competition in finding a new job. On the contrary, in a UK 
sample  that  the  result  is  opposite  and  may  be  interpreted  in  the  sense  that  widespread 
unemployment condition of peers reduces the negative comparison effect and that this factor 
has a higher effect on life satisfaction than the relatively lower probability of finding a new 
job. 
 
To conclude on this point it is very important to clarify that the consequent policy advice of 
results presented in this section is not the pursuit of full equality. What is said here is only 
that human beings generally suffer inequality and comparisons with peers when the latter 
overperform them on average on a given performance indicator. The reaction to this is most 
of times envy and is not always transformed into the positive energy of emulation or simply 
lack of sensitiveness to the unpleasant  comparison. The  definition  of the optimal level  of 






2.5 Hedonic adaptation 
 
 
Hedonic adaptation is one of the most powerful mechanisms which can reconcile evidence on 
the  concave  instantaneous  utility  functions  and  the  insignificance  of  the  income  effect  of 
happiness in the long run documented by the Easterlin paradox and supported by Easterlin 
and Angelescu (2009) and Bartolini et al. (2010) results. 
From an empirical point of view hedonic adaptation is calculated by testing whether the sum 
of  current  and  lagged  (personal  or  household)  income  coefficients  in  a  life  satisfaction 
regression are significantly different from zero. When the null hypothesis is not rejected we 
have evidence of full adaptation, that is, current (generally positive) and lagged (generally 
negative) income effects compensate each other. From a theoretical point of view this implies 
that the concave utility function assumption does hold in a given instant of time but not 
across time. Frey and Stutzer (2000) illustrate this concept by  showing that, with a given 
increase in income, we move along the shape of the utility function in the current period (a 
positive and significant nonlinear effect), but, later on, the monetary achievement triggers a 
rise  in  expectations  which  causes  a  downshift  of  the  instantaneous  utility  curve.  If  the 
dynamics is repeated in time and we link the different observed combinations of income and 
utility at given time intervals we may end up having a flatter or flat relationship which is 




evidence showing that, for a given level of income, higher aspirations and expectations have a 




3. The other stylized facts of life satisfaction 
 
 
The literature on life satisfaction has progressively extended its interest to factors different 
from income after the discovery of the importance of non monetary factors in explaining the 
same relationship between monetary factors and happiness. Here below we survey some of 
the most important developments. 
 
3.1 Happiness and sociability  
 
The time I invested in the rose made it unique to me 
Antoine de Saint Exupery 
 
To understand properly the relationship between happiness  and sociability it is essential to 
introduce the concept of relational goods. 
The  economic  literature  has  concentrated  its  analysis  on  production  and  consumption  of 
private and public goods and has almost completely neglected a third important category: 
relational goods.  Relational goods have often been confused with private goods even though 
they have completely different, sometimes opposite, characteristics.   
 
Relational goods are a specific kind of local public goods (requiring the joint participation of at least 
two individuals) for which investment, production and consumption coincide (Gui, 2000; Ulhaner, 
1989). Relational goods are, on a smaller scale, lived in family relationships, friendships and 
any  kind  of  social  or  recreational  organizations.  They  include  companionship,  emotional 
support, social approval, solidarity.  These goods  may also be produced in many kinds of 
social events (club or association meetings, live sport events, etc.). A general laughter during 
a comic movie, supporters‘ enthusiasm at the stadium when their team scores a goal and 
applauses at a theatre are examples of relational goods produced on this larger scale.7  These 
features help to understand that the production p rocess of these goods is the meeting  - 
‗encounter‘ in Gui 2005‘s definition - with family and friends or with a wider net of partners.  
In relational goods production, investment and consumption coincide since participating to a 
relationship is both an act of production (my presence contributes to the increase in the value 
of  the  good),  investment  (the  time  invested  in  the  relationship  makes  it  stronger)    and 
consumption (I enjoy it while producing it).  
 
                                                 
7 A football match and a comic movie may be seen alone on TV but, in that case, the absence of other close co-
participants will deprive the participant of the fruition of the above mentioned public goods incorporated in 




Relational goods are local public goods in the sense that nonexcludabilty and non rivalry are 
limited to participants.  
Actually, they are a special kind of public goods since they should be more properly defined 
as antirival than non rival since their very same nature is based on interpersonal sharing of 
them.  More  to  it,  participation  to  their  production  and  consumption  generates  a  positive 
externality on partners and enhances the quality of the public good itself (to the extreme of 
mass  social  events  where  congestion  can  increase  utility  !).  This  is  why  nonrivalry  and 
nonexcludability are not viewed by participants as negative elements preventing them from 
exploiting all private benefits of the good, but as positive elements which implement its value 
(my satisfaction is actually higher, or even uniquely possible in case of only two partners, 
when another is also participating and taking pleasure). 
 
A crucial feature of relational goods is that they require sincerity or genuineness to be valuable 
(Bruni and Stanca,  2008). These two features cannot be acquired on the market8 (without 
being transformed in something completely different) even though they can be generated as a 
by product of some instrumental activity.9 
Bardsley and Sugden (2006)  use the Adam Smith‘s Theory of Moral Sentiments concept of 
‗fellow-feelings‘, to describe the mental states produced during such non instrumental social 
interactions. Fellow feelings are, in turn, fuelled by emotional consent and a record of intense 
experiences lived together.  
Given this definition, it appears clear that relational goods are a different way of including 
―others‖ in the utility function with respect to the well established relative income approach 




Why do we stress the concept of relational goods and what  has it to do with happiness (and 
with the Easterlin‘s puzzle) ? In essence the points are that: i) the importance of relationships 
has been always neglected in theoretical models and, as a consequence, in policy suggestions; 
ii) relational goods suffer from a sort of Baumol‘s disease which will be illustrated below and 
the fall of their productions has important effects on individual happiness.  
                                                 
8 This does not mean that they don‘t have a price and a shadow value to be estimated. 
9 This does not prevent the possibility that relational goods are bundled with other goods. When  travel agents 
sell packaged holidays for affinity groups, they are in a sense also putting in the bundle the companionship  of 
fellow-customers, while clubs the companionship of fellow members (Becchetti, Giachin and Pelloni, 2009a). In 
such case the non instrumentality of the companionship is preserved by the fact that the actual producers of the 
relational goods are not their sellers (e ven though it is not said that the bundling produces the best quality of 
relational goods).  
10 Different ways of considering others in the utility function have correspondences in alternative  philosophical 
views on human relationships. Grossly simplifying,  in the history of literature and philosophy we move from 
the extreme perspective of Camus, for which ―hell is others‖, to that of a branch of philosophical thought which 
includes  Mounier  (1949),  Levinas  (1972)  and  Buber  (2002)  considering  the  human  nature  as  intrinsically 
relational (or persons as ―knots into which relationships are tied‖) and thereby arguing that human flourishing 




To understand it consider that, with extremely rare exceptions, relationships do not appear 
directly in the homo oeconomicus utility function. An objection to this point may be that others 
are nonetheless, even though indirectly, taken into account in consumer choices since they are 
incorporated  into  leisure    or  purchasing  choices  (i.e.  strong  relational  preferences  may 
increase the demand for large houses versus small lofts, or  family cars versus single place 
cars, etc.). This way of considering relational goods has however several limits: i) it is possible 
to enjoy relational goods without purchasing anything (ie. in a walk with a friend); ii) leisure 
is a general concept which incorporates many different  activities which can be relational, 
pseudo-relational (second life in internet) or utterly non relational (hours spent alone on the 
TV);  iii)  relational  goods  may  also  be  produced  and  consumed  when  relationship  with 
colleagues are good and there is a favourable working atmosphere.  
For all these reasons it is important to test empirically whether the standard restriction in the 
utility function for which relationship do not matter holds, that is, to evaluate whether the 
time spent for relational goods has significant effects on life satisfaction (Becchetti, Pelloni 
and Rossetti, 2008). 
The  neglect  of  relational  goods  does  not  only  create  problems  when  evaluating  factors 
affecting individual life satisfaction but may also lead to important consequences in terms of 
trust and productivity. As we all know, situations like those of prisoner‘s dilemma, traveler‘s 
game  and  trust  games  illustrate  important  cases  in  which  trust  and  cooperation  increase 
social payoff. Given that a trustful atmosphere  may depend not only on law  but also on 
norms  which are fostered by interpersonal relations ( Putnam 2000)11 relational goods are an 
important factor easing productive relationships and the production of public goods.  
 
3.1.1 Relational goods, happiness estimates and the Baumol’s relational disease  
 
It would not be correct to argue that the above described conception of relational goods is 
completely excluded from standard happiness estimates. Marital status controls are in fact 
important proxies which measure, in some way, the accumulated stock of a specific kind of 
relational good (love affection) where we may imagine a given threshold of such stock which 
delimits success from failure in the provision of the relational good itself (or marriage and/or 
stable partnerships from separation or divorce).  
What is however completely neglected in standard happiness estimates is the focus on the 
actual  production  of  relational  goods  and,  more  specifically,  of  other  types  of  relational 
goods.  
If we carefully look at characteristics of relational goods we may understand why they can 
suffer  from  a  Baumol‘s  relational  disease  (Baumol  and  Bowen,  1965).    In  the  classical 
Baumol‘s disease it is argued that the relative price of performing arts versus manufacturing 
activities  has  exploded  in  the  last  century.  While  once  the  time  needed  by  an  artisan  to 
produce  a  watch  was  exactly  the  same  as  that  to  produce  one  hour  of  performing  art, 
technological innovation, division of labour and mass production allow today to produce 
hundreds of watches in the hour needed to produce an hour of performing art. This is why 
                                                 
11 We notice however that the econometric techniques we use are unable to capture these more universal benefits 




the relative price of performing art has exploded. Relational goods are similar to performing 
arts since they require an almost fixed amount of time invested to be produced. Exactly as for 
performing art technological progress in other areas (but also the explosion of various forms 
of non relational or pseudo-relational leisure) has increased opportunity costs of the time 
dedicated to them. The additional complication is that the requirement of joint effort with 
partners needed to produce them creates coordination failure problems and does not allow a 
solution to the problem on individual basis.12 The Baumol‘s disease of relational goods may 
help  to  explain  the  decline  in  participation  to  social  activities  observed  among  others  by 
Putnam (2000) and Bartolini et  al. (2009) 
The Baumol‘s disease and the coordination failure arguments provide an interpretation of the 
paradox of overconsumption of goods satisfying extrinsic needs (material goods beside basic 
necessities)  and  underconsumption  of  goods  satisfying  intrinsic  needs  (relational  goods 
among them) without departing from rationality by assuming that people tend to mispredict 
utility,  through  underestimation  of  adaptation,  distorted  memories  of  past  experiences, 
materialistic beliefs fostered by institutions (e.g. marketing) (as in Frey et al. 2007). 
Even though under different definitions and forms, this issue is at the center of the 
interpretation of differences in hours worked between US and Europa and the consequences 
of strategic relational complementarities in the enjoyment of leisure (Alesina et. al., 2005 and 
Burda et al., 2008). As it is well known, in the ―US equilibrium‖, individuals work a lot, 
consume  a  lot,  and  have  reduced  time  for  communal  activities.  On  the  contrary,  in  the 
―European equilibrium‖, they work less and consume less, but enjoy more common leisure.  
This difference might not depend from a difference in the tax system (Prescott, 2004) or 
in tastes (Blanchard, 2006). An alternative hypothesis is that history (e.g., the first oil shock) 
and institutions (labor-market regulations) have simply led otherwise identical Americans 
and Europeans to coordinate on different equilibria.13 The relationship of these two equilibria 
with happiness is analyzed by  Alesina et al. (2005) documenting that happiness is higher in 
countries with lower working hours. To this piece of evidence we may  add that in the 
European countries we observe an upward -sloping trend in happiness and a downward 
sloping trend in hours worked against no trend in happiness and a upward sloping trend in 
hours worked in the US as shown by Wolfers and Stevenson (2008). 
To sum up, the Baumol‘s relational disease and the coordination problem in production of 
relational goods provide an alternative path for explaining the Easterlin paradox.  In affluent 
societies with high productive jobs and plenty of non relational leisure activities available the 
opportunity cost of time invested in relational life rises. This phenomenon reduces personal 
investment and creates coordination failures leading to a reduction of the relational goods 
                                                 
12 See on this point, among others,  Corneo (2005), Jenkins and Osberg (2003) and  Antoci at al. (2005) reflecting 
in their models on consequences of the fact that individual‘s time use choices may be contingent on the time use 
choices of others.  
13 According to these authors one of the strongest pieces of evidence in favor of complementarities across either 
leisure or work is that an overwhelming share of the population both in Europe and the US takes its two days of 
leisure during Saturday and Sunday. There would be huge benefits from staggering work so that different 
people take different days off during the week: this could reduce commuting time and  would allow capital to 
be spread over more workers: the fact that this is not done suggest that the costs in terms of forgone welfare due 




produced  in  equilibrium.  Since  such  goods  are  important  drivers  of  life  satisfaction  this 
phenomenon has important negative effects on psychological wellbeing.  
 
 
3.2 Happiness and children: the fertility puzzle  
 
The  relationship  between  life  satisfaction  and  children  is  another  interesting  strand  of 
happiness research which may provide relevant insights for policies by helping to calculate 
the effects of pro or anti fertility policies  and identify both pecuniary and non pecuniary 
effects of children on life satisfaction.  
Beyond its importance for fiscal policies the research on this field highlights a fertility puzzle 
which leads us to reflect about individual preferences, motivational complexity and what is 
effectively measured by self declared life satisfaction. 
Most happiness papers use the number of children as a control without explicitly focusing on 
the econometric results on this variable. Evidence from this ―indirect‖ literature14 shows that, 
when using as regressor a measure of non equivalised household income in life satisfaction 
estimates, the number of children has often negative15 or insignificant  16effects. In a recent 
survey Dolan et al. (2008) show that the impact is  more negative  when economic and 
relational conditions are harsher such as in cases of single parents (Frey and Stutzer, 2000;  
Angeles, 2009), divorced mothers (Schoon et al., 2005), poor families (Alesina et al., 2004 for 
the US), children over 3 years (e.g. Shields and Price, 2005 ) or who are sick and require extra 
care (Marks et al., 2002).17 
The other approach for measuring life satisfaction (momentary affect calculated with 
daily reconstruction method)18 finds similar results by showing that taking care of children is 
among the less satisfaction-enhancing activities (Kahneman et al., 2004).  
In spite of it, Easterlin (2005) il lustrates that people want to have children and their 
desires do not change much during their life cycle (around 70 percent of people want at least 
one child  and the average desired number of children is around 2). An even stronger 
conclusion provided by t he author is that aspirations about children are not affected by 
hedonic adaptation, that is, do not adjust to the level of achievement as it is usually the case 
for material ends.  
                                                 
14  For  indirect  literature  we  mean  empirical  analyses  focused  on  the  impact  of  other  factors  which  use  the 
number of children as control variable. The direct literature concerns analyses focused exactly on the impact of 
the number of children on happiness.Evidence on both sides has pros and cons. The advantage of ―indirect‖ 
literature  is  that  it  provides  an  unintended  result  on  something  which  is  not  the  focus  of  the  paper.  The 
disadvantage is that in the indirect literature there is no specific effort of the researchers in going beyond the 
first regression findings to check the robustness of results on the variable which is not of specific interest of the 
paper. 
15Frey and Stutzer (2000),  Alesina et al. (2004), Di Tella et al. (2003) and Smith (2003) documenting that children 
have stronger negative effect in UK and the US than in Europe or Russia.  
16 Haller and Hadler (2006) in the WVS; Van Praag, Frijters and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2003) in a 1992-1997 GSOEP 
estimate on West and East German workers.  
17 Needless to say we are talking about an aggregate average effect. Subsample splits, interactions with slope 
dummies and quantile regressions can articulate in more detail the relationship between the two variables. 




Since  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  child  births  can  be  explained  on  aggregate  by  a 
problem of lack of self-control, we must wonder why people desire (or do not prevent) something 
that is going to have negative effects on their life satisfaction.  
To answer this question it is possible to identify at least five potential explanations.  
First, we may be induced to think that the negative effect vanishes once we eliminate 
from the estimate respondents living in the ―harsher conditions‖ described above by Dolan 
(2008). Robustness checks on the German Socioeconomic Panel however show that the effect 
does not disappear when single mothers are eliminated from the sample (Becchetti et al., 
2009)  
A second explanation may be related to life cycle effects. On this point the variability of 
parental  wellbeing  reaction  to  children  across  life  is  demonstrated  by  Clark  et  al.  (2008) 
documenting  how  first  child  births  have  a  positive  impact  around  the  event  date  which 
however lasts only one year. Another life cycle effect is shown by Stanca (2009) and Becchetti 
et al., (2010) observing that, in a broader time horizon and with cross-sectional estimates on a 
large  number  of  countries,  the  effect  of  children  becomes  positive  and  significant  for 
individuals above a given age threshold. The picture which can be drawn from these results 
is quite realistic. Waiting the first child is a life satisfaction enhancing event but the difficulties 
of living with her/him after birth compensate such effect. While children are at home the 
effect gets negative and becomes again positive when parents are old and can rely on their 
offspring both on a relational and on an economic effect.  
The  puzzle  however  remains.  When  people  decide  to  have  children  they  may  be 
rational  only  if  the  present  discounted  effect  of  current  and  future  life  satisfaction  states 
generated by this decision is positive, while what we measure is a negative effect. To  explain 
that,  we  may  assume  that  life  satisfaction  declarations  are  biased  toward  the  closer  past 
events,  while  actual  individual  decisions  are  taken  on  different  grounds  or  under  the 
standard approach of utility under rational expectations, that is, the present discounted value 
of  current  and  future  expected  life  satisfaction  with  fully  rational  and  forward  looking 
capacity to evaluate it. In such case we should admit that self declared life satisfaction is more 
backward  looking  and  does  not  measure  utility  of  forward  looking  rational  individuals, 
perfectly anticipating what is going to happen in the future.  
A third explanation which also departs from the perfect information assumption is that 
individuals  mainly  look  at  the  relational  effect  of  having  children  and  underestimate  the 
economic effect on their income and the nonpecuniary costs of rearing them. 
The  paradox  can  also  be  solved  by  the  assumption  of  motivational  complexity.  By 
considering the Sen (1977) argument on the fact that individuals are not just moved by self-
interest, but also by sympathy and commitment, we might consider that the decision to have 
children falls into those duties which most people feel they have to comply with. Even if it 
cannot explain all the fertility decisions, this hypothesis is not rejected by empirical evidence. 
Individuals attending religious services have significantly more children even though they do 
not experiment a different impact of children on life satisfaction than those not attending. 
 
In  the  introduction  we  mentioned  that  the  relationship  between  happiness  and 
children  is  another  field  where  happiness  studies  may  provide  relevant  policy  insights. 




help  to  estimate  the  shadow  value  of  the  gross  (pecuniary  plus  non  pecuniary)  effect  of 
having  them.  This  can  be  done  by  replacing  the  household  income  with  the  equivalised 
income using proper (demand based19 or stated utility level20) equivalence scales. In this case 
the pecuniary effect of children (the reduction of the income available for any single member 
of the household) may be separated by the non pecuniary (  i.e.  relational)  one  captured  by 
the number of children variable. 
  In such case the shadow value of both the aggregate and the two decomposed effects 
may be interesting for policies. The aggrega te effect may help to calculate the subsidy (tax) 
needed  to  stimulate  (reduce)  fertility.  The  ne t  non  pecuniary  component  may  help  to 
calculate the non pecuniary (relational) cost of the divorced parent who is not living anymore 
with their children. Results  on German GSOEP data at individual level recorded for more 
than 20 years  show that the negativ e effect of having children is relatively stronger for  
women, East Germans and individuals above median income in both East and West Germany 
(Becchetti et al., 2010).  
To sum up, several rationales may help us to explain the children puzzle (decision of h aving 
children in spite of their average negative effect on life satisfaction). Some of them imply 
departures from selfishness and rationality (lack of self control,  moral commitment), while 
some  others  question  our  capacity  of  calculating  correctly  conseq uences  of  our  choices 
(underestimation of the economic and child bearing consequences of fertility decisions). The 
negative average effect may however hide strong variability of the  impact across gender and 
income levels. The inability to understand how much these different rationales matter poses 
serious limits on the effect of policy measures and on the potential success of monetary 
incentives aimed at affecting fertility decisions.  
A final interesting point is that, if we relate happiness results with the well known ones 
of the development literature on women education ,  we may convene that they are two 
extremes  of the same phenomenon   (Becker et al., 1990) .  On the one side, the increase in 
female education (and the consequent increase in their opportunity  cost of having children) 
has been one of the most effective measures reducing explosive demographic trends (and 
promoting economic growth) in developing countries. On the other side ,  life satisfaction 
evidence tells us that subsidies to women can compensa te too high opportunity costs which 




3.3 Education and happiness 
 
Following Castriota (2009) we identify  at least eight reasons why education should have a 
direct  positive  effect  on  life  satisfaction:  i)  a  minimum  level  of  capabilities  is  required  to 
appear in public without shame; ii) knowledge is like a standard good which provides direct 
                                                 
19 The first demand based approach makes use of so-called expert scales, where given weights are assigned to 
different household members and is the approach commonly used in income inequality analyses. 





utility  per  se  increasing  the  set  of  available  functionings  and  capabilities.  Furthermore, 
education iii) is a useful instrument to signal one‘s own skills in a framework of asymmetric 
information  between  the  worker  and  the  potential  employer;  iv)  fosters  labor  market 
participation,  employability  and  job  protection  and  v)  is  positively  correlated  with 
productivity and earnings (see Becker, 1994); (vi) is related with job satisfaction since the 
educational attainment helps getting more interesting jobs and increase the probability of 
career  advancement  (Blanchflower  and  Oswald,  1994),  vii)  enhances  autonomy  and 
independence on the job and participation in relevant decisions (Albert and Davia, 2005); viii) 
affects  positively  health,  given  that  more  educated  people  are  supposed  to  have  less 
unhealthy  habits  given  their  higher  capacity  of  exploiting  new  information  abut  healthy 
lifestyles.21 
   
This list of benefits clearly shows that when evaluating the impact of education on happiness 
what needs to be carefully evaluated is a complex pattern of direct and indirect effects.  More 
specifically,  only the first t wo  items generate  a positive direct effect   on life satisfaction, 
whereas items from iii) to vii) illustrate indirect paths for a positive effect through reduced 
probability of unemployment and increased wage and non wage job satisfaction. The indirect 
pecuniary  job  satisfaction  channel  finds  strong  support  at  micro  (return  to  schooling 
literature)22 and macro (the role of education and human capital in conditional convergence) 
level. Finally, a crucial positive indirect effect is through health which is one o f the  most 
important variables determining life satisfaction. 
These positive effects are however counteract ed by the impact of education on aspiration 
levels  since,  everything  else  being  equal,  an  increase  in  aspirations  may  reduce  life 
satisfaction. An anecdotal example may be given by looking at how the range of job positions 
desirable by students changes according to their education record.  Jobs which are desired 
with lower education levels become undesirable with higher education levels. If there is 
much shortage and competition for higher quality than lower quality jobs the gap between 
aspirations and achievements may increase with education.  
The combination of these factors leads to a  non necessarily positive and significant  direct 
effect of education, net of other concurring factors.23 The point  is well resumed by Frey and 
Stutzer (2002b, p. 59) claiming that ―the level of education, as such, bears little relationship to 
happiness.  Education  is  highly  correlated  with  income  ...  Education  may  indirectly  contribute  to 
happiness  by  allowing  a  better  adaptation  to  changing  environments.  But  it  also  tends  to  raise 
                                                 
21 Hayward et al (2005) document that ―Educational attainment is positively associated both with health status 
and with healthy lifestyles. For example, in the 1996-97 [Canadian] National Population Health Survey, only 
19% of respondents with less than high school education rated their health as ‗excellent‘, compared with almost 
30%  of  university  graduates.  Self-rated  health,  in  turn,  has  been  shown  to  be  a  reliable  predictor  of  health 
problems, health-care utilization, and longevity. From a health determinant perspective, education is clearly a 
good investment that can reduce long-term health care costs‖ (pp.37-38). 
22 For a survey on this literature see Card (1999). 
23 For positive and significant results see   Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) on Eurobarometer data, 
Becchetti Castriota and Londoño (2006) on World Value Survey data,  Albert and Davia (2005) on the European 
Community Household Panel and Hayo and Seifert (2003) for Eastern European countries between 1991 and 





aspiration levels. It has, for instance, been found that the highly educated are more distressed than the 
less well educated when they are hit by unemployment (Clark and Oswald, 1994)‖.  
If the effect of education on mean happiness is not always clear cut that on the distribution is 
more  clear  cut  since  higher  shares  of  highly  educated  individuals  significantly  reduce 
happiness inequality (Becchetti, Massari and Naticchioni, 2010). 
A possible rationale for this finding is that education widens the set of functionings and 
capabilities. Since functionings are ―various things a person may value being or doing‖ (Sen, 
1999,  p.75),  the  nexus  between  the  increase  of  functionings  and  the  enhancement  of 
capabilities is not unreasonable. Furthermore, since an important part of happiness inequality 
is explained by fat low tails (higher share of individuals with very low life satisfaction scores), 
higher education, by enlarging the set of functionings and capabilities, reduces the likelihood 
that individuals are devoid of sufficient resources to escape the low satisfaction trap. Such 
resources may be, following what observed at the beginning of this section, the  increased 
possibility of finding  satisfactory and well remunerated jobs,  of taking care of one‘s own 
health  and  the  additional  opportunities  that  educated  people  have  to  enjoy  leisure  by 




3.4 Religion and happiness 
 
Another  quasi-stylised  fact  in  happiness  research  is  given  by  the  positive  and  significant 
effect of religious practice (but not religious education per se) in most econometric studies. If 
we consider the role of religion, without entering into any discussion about faith, we may 
observe that it possesses at least two elements which, in the light of empirical results from life 
satisfaction  studies,  seem  to  be  devised  exactly  to  affect  positively  life  satisfaction.  First, 
several studies in economics and psychology show that individuals tend to adapt quickly to 
positive events while effects of negative shocks tend to persist (Costa et al. 1987; Cummins et 
al., 2004). By training believers‘ gratitude and providing a rationale for negative aspects of life 
religion aims at increasing (reducing) persistence of positive (negative) shocks. Second, while 
research on relative income (and, more generally, on other peer comparisons) shows that we 
suffer  from  comparisons  with  better-off  peers  (see  section  2.4)  and  our  competitive 
socioeconomic context tends to exasperate such differences by praising the winners, religion 
compensates these  potential negative  effects on individual wellbeing  of the non  top rank 
majority of people by advocating equal dignity of all individuals and by proposing a reverted 
ranking (poor and humble are preferred to the mighty and rich).  
In addition to it, religious participation obviously creates a (vertical and horizontal) relational 
good for believers stimulating common consent and fellow feelings of participants especially 
when believers‘ community ties are stronger. 
These happiness enhancing factors must compensate potentially negative ones (when religion 
is  lived  as  a  constraint  on  individual  freedom  or  as  a  source  of  sacrifices  or  when  more 









3.5 Marital status 
 
The positive and significant relationship between marital status and happiness is  a result 
emerging  from  the  large  majority  of  happiness  empirical  papers  where  marital  status 
variables  are  always  included  as  standard  controls.  Actually  marital  status  controls  are 
generally  considered  as  both  states  (married,  divorced,  separated,  widowed,  cohabiting, 
single) and changes (marriage, divorce, separation). 
As for many other happiness drivers it is interesting to look at both the ―indirect‖ and the 
―direct‖ literature.  
The indirect literature presents in most cases a positive and significant effect of the married 
and a negative and significant effect of separated  or divorced status (Di Tella, Mc Culloch 
and Oswald (2003) in the US and Europe; Blanchflower and Oswald (2004) in the UK; Frijters 
and Beatton (2008) in Germany; Frey and Stutzer (2002a) in Switzerland and Graham and 
Pettinato (2002) in Latin America and Russia). The negative effect of the divorced status is 
generally  weaker,  consistently  with  the  set  point  theory  assumption  that  shocks  tend 
generally to be reabsorbed over time (Costa et al. 1987; Cummins et al., 2004). Blanchflower 
and Oswald (2004) calculate that the shadow value of a lasting marriage is, on average, worth 
$100,000 per year.24   
The marriage result is remarkable   if we think that it must necessarily be an average of 
successful  and  unsucce ssful  (but  not  leading  to  separation)  marriages.   Again  here  the 
causality nexus is difficult to ascertain. Consider however that, if marriage may make people 
happier, it may nonetheless be the case that individuals with more prosocial personality traits 
and  more  optimistic   attitude  toward  life  are  more  likely  to  find  themselves  in  stable 
marriages. 
In this respect  the  analysis  of the  impact of changes in marital status is i nteresting and 
important helping us to disentangle direct from reverse causality effect.  
From this point of view a paper from Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas (2008) documents a 
―hill  effect‖  around  the  marriage  events  with  happiness  increasing  up  to  the  event  and 
declining after it.  
To avoid endogeneity the authors control for pre-marriage levels of happiness. They find 
some evidence of self selection but also of a positive and significant effect of marriage on life 
satisfaction. Waite et al. (2002) also look at dynamic effects around the event and observe that 
adaptation  to marriage  is partial but not complete  so that the latter generates permanent 
effects on welfare. 
The more recent literature goes more in depth by exploring factors which may determine 
satisfaction  or  lack  of  satisfaction  in  marriage.  and  Frey  and  Stutzer  (2006)  observe  that 
                                                 
24 A discussion on the use of happiness regression in calculating shadow values of non market goods is provided 




division of labour is important for spouses‘ well-being and especially so for women when 
there are young children to raise. In addition to it,  above median differences in partners‘ 
education level have a negative effect on experienced life satisfaction compared to those of 




4.Critiques and methodology of happiness research: can we rely on life satisfaction survey 
data ?  
 
A first general critique to the empirical studies on the determinants of happiness is that the 
realm  of  economic  research  should  be  limited  to  what  is  observable  and,  consequently, 
individual satisfaction should be solely inferred by economic agents‘ saving, investment and 
consumption choices (for a survey of this arguments see Frey and Stutzer, 2002). The typical 
reply to this critique is that the same bundle of consumption goods, or the same measurable 
level of material well-being, may hide completely different levels of satisfaction according to 
heterogeneous intrinsic and extrinsic motivations and different courses of action leading to 
the same material outcome.25 This argument may be resumed by arguing that experience utility 
is at least as relevant as choice utility. In this sense the empirical research on the determinants 
of  happiness  overcomes  the  ―instrumentalist‖  assumption  that  selected  strategies  and 
experience lived during the course of actions have no effects on individual happiness beyond 
the realized outcome. 26 
 
4.1 How to measure happiness: life satisfaction and momentary approach 
 
As  it  may  be  easily  imagined  the  empirical  studies  on  life  satisfaction  pose  a  series  of 
methodological problems which cannot be easily solved. First of all, how happiness should be 
measured ? From this point of view the literature is divided into two strands. According to a 
first (largely followed by economists) life satisfaction is intended as an overall evaluation of 
one‘s own life, everything considered, without particular reference to the most recent events. 
The typical question consistent with this view and contained in large databases such as the 
GSOEP and the BHPS is ―How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered ?‖ with 
response is given on the basis of a 0-10 or 0-7 Likert scale. 
In spite of these intentions the literature shows that most recent events are shown to have 
extra weight in life satisfaction answers (Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber & Redelmeier, 
                                                 
25 A first paradox we meet into in this field is that economists tend to believe that goals achieved with the 
minimum effort are those giving the highest level of utility while in many cases it may be exactly the opposite 
since effort gives flavor to what has been conquered. 
26 On this point it worth mentioning Frey and Stuzter (2002a) reporting Sen's (1986) sentence on the fact that \the 
popularity of the positivistic view is due to a mixture of an obsessive concern with observability and a peculiar belief that 
choice...is the only human aspect that can be observed" and providing several examples of nonobjectivist analyses 
such  as  theoretical  studies  on  emotions  (Elster,  1998),  self  signaling,  goal  completion  mastery  and  meaning 





1993; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). An example of it is provided by Schwarz (1987) who 
divides  his  experimental  sample  into  two  groups  and  asks  to  all  participants  to  do  a 
photocopy of the questionnaire. A (treatment) group of participants find in the photocopy a 
dime while the (control) group doesn‘t. The author documents that ex post the treatment 
group declares higher levels of life  satisfaction.  In  the same  direction  Schwarz and Clore 
(1983) demonstrate that atmospheric conditions are another factor close to the time of the 
question which people tend to overweight in their life satisfaction evaluation.  
The above mentioned factors add noise to life satisfaction as a measure of true experienced 
utility. The consequence is that the signal-to-noise ratio has to be sufficiently high to make 
empirical  research  productive  (Di  Tella  andMacCulloch,  2006).  In  general  the  disturbing 
influence of more recent events should not produce effects if we assume that shocks close to 
the interview time are randomly distributed with zero mean, an assumption which is all the 
more  reasonable  in  large  samples.  Furthermore,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  effect  of 
atmospheric conditions which can affect more systematically a large number of respondents 
interviewed in short intervals of time, can be significantly reduced by introducing a specific 
question on weather conditions in the questionnaire. 
The second  approach for measuring happiness (momentary affect) has been mostly devised 
by the nobel price Daniel Kanheman27. In such approach (generally applied with  the daily 
reconstruction method) respondents are asked to record the main events occurring during 
their day registering in parallel their state of satisfaction during each of them.   
Even though happiness and pleasure are two different things (a masochist is happy even in 
pain or a stoic is happy even in sacrifice) the momentary affect, by reducing the distance 
between the event to be evaluated and the evaluation, reduces also the distance between the 
two concepts and bring happiness studies closer to an hedonistic perspective. This i s not the 
case of the first life satisfaction approach where individuals may declare themselves satisfied 
about their life even though in it there have been hardship, sacrifices and moments of pain or 
sorrow.28 
Note as well that the first approach in measur ing happiness, by containing information on 
respondents'  global  evaluation  of  their  life,  reduces  the  possibility  of  interp reting  life 
satisfaction scores as a mere a subutility function, as Kimball and Willis (2006) conjecture for 
measures of current affe ct.  The parallelism between life satisfaction measures and utility 
functions commonly adopted in the economic models still presents some problems.  Do 
individuals express lifetime utility or flow -utility related to specific and more recent events 
when declaring their life satisfaction levels ? Some of the findings commented in the section 
(3.2) looking at children and happiness seems to suggest that the second possibility cannot be 
ruled out.  
 
 
4.2 Cardinality, ordinality and cultural bias 
                                                 
27 For an overview see Kahneman and Kreueger (2006). 
28 A useful distinction akin to the two approaches is made by Kahneman and Krueger (2006 , p.5) with the two 
concepts of experienced utility and remembered utility, that is, between ―the way people feel about experiences in 





A second main methodological problem in the life satisfaction literature is related to the use 
of  cardinality.  As  we  all  know  the  standard  economic  theory  moved  from  cardinality  to 
ordinality by establishing that it is possible to express one‘s own preference among bundles 
of goods (under the assumption of completeness, reflexivity, monotonicity and transitivity) 
while it is not possible to make comparisons among two different levels of happiness. By 
considering the GSOEP measure of happiness (0-10 integer values), even if we are not asked 
to say that a level of 4 expresses an ―amount‖ of happiness which is twice as much as the 
level of 2, we still need to assume homogeneity of life satisfaction scales across individuals. 
This problem should prevent us from making interpersonal comparisons using self-reported 
measures  at  the  individual  level  (Harsanyi,1955).  Consider  however that  the valuation  of 
public goods only requires inter-group comparisons or that the life satisfaction evaluations 
are comparable across groups of individuals under different circumstances. The interpersonal 
comparability problem is reduced by the focus on groups since we do have usually no a 
priori  reason  to  assume  that  a  large  group  of  respondents  should  be  scoring  themselves 
systematically differently in a way that interferes with estimating the coefficients of interest 
(Di Tella and McCulloch, 2006). 
Again, on this point Cantril (1965) observes that individual evaluations on the 0-10 scales are 
quite comparable and Clark et al. (2008) argue that in other professions, such as medicine, 
cardinality is implicitly accepted and considered reliable when, for instance, a doctor asks to 
his  patient  how  much  a  given  touched  part  of  the  body  hurts  (and  bases  on  an  implicit 
comparison with  other patients‘ declarations his evaluation of the intensity of the pain). 
 
The problem is further complicated by the presence of cultural differences when comparing 
responses of individuals from different countries. In this case we first have a semantic issue 
since the same world of happiness does not have the same meaning in different languages 
(see footnote 2). In addition to it, cultural habits may generate significant country biases (it 
may be considered polite and correct in a given culture to declare oneself always satisfied 
while, in another one, people may tend to overcomplain). 
More  recently,  a  very  interesting  approach  to  solve  this  issue  has  been  that  which  uses 
vignettes  describing  situations  of  happiness  or  sorrow  and  ask  to  people  to  attribute  an 
happiness  level  to  individuals  in  the  vignette.  This  approach  has  been  used  to  test  for 
heterogeneity  in  life  satisfaction  scales  and  to  evaluate  its  effect  on  standard  happiness 
regressions. In one of the most recent papers Beegle et al. (2009) perform an experiment of 
this type on a large sample and show that respondents hold diverse scales when assessing 
their  wellbeing.  Nonetheless,  they  find  little  bias  in  the  identification  of  significant 
determinants  of  life  satisfaction.  These  findings    are  important  since  they  give  a  firmer 
foundation to survey methods and life satisfaction regressions. 
Needless to say, these problems make a fixed effect panel estimate (where basically what we 
measure  are  within  effect  for  each  individual)  more  reliable  than  cross-sectional  country 
comparisons which are unfortunately the aspects which however attract most of the curiosity 





In spite of all these methodological problems Alesina et al. (2004) remind us that there are a 
series of arguments in favour of the reliability of life satisfaction studies.   
The  most relevant  are that:  (i) the long tradition of happiness studies in psychology and 
sociology which documents that the latter have survived a cultural ―Darwinian selection‖ in 
these disciplines (Alesina, Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2004); (ii) the health related literature 
findings documenting significant and positive links between self-declared happiness levels 
and healthy physical reactions such as smiling attitudes (Pavot et al., 1991 and Eckman et al., 
1990) and heart rate and blood pressure responses to stress (Shedler, Mayman and Manis, 
1993); (iii) the capacity of wellbeing levels of being reliable predictors of future respondents‘ 
behaviour (i.e. individuals choose to discontinue activities associated with (Frijters, 2000 and 
Shiv  and  Huber,  2000));  (v)  the  close  correspondence  between  respondents‘  self-declared 
happiness  and  the  evaluation  of  the  same  respondents  provided  by    friends  and  family 
members (see Sandvik et al., 1993 and Diener and Lucas, 1999). (vi) the significant nexus 
between positive feelings and physical measures of brain activity (higher alpha power in the 
left parefrontal cortex) identified in neuroscience studies when, at the same time, measures of 
hedonic well being, such as self-declared life satisfaction, have been shown to be related to 
the same brain activity (Clark et al., 2006). 
This last argument deserves further consideration since it shows how neuroscience studies 
may create a third independent  type of empirical measures which may reinforce consistency 
checks  on  the  two  traditional  ones.  In  essence,  individual  may  express  themselves  with 
revealed choices, with declarations collected in  survey data and  with physiological  states 
which can now be tracked with brain images. All of these measures have limits when taken 
individually: the value of non market goods and experienced utility cannot be measured with 
revealed choices, survey answers are riddled with interview biases (see section 4.5)  while 
brain  images  are  not  free  from  observational  equivalence  and  statistical  approximations 
(what is the blood flow threshold which delimits significant from not significant brain activity 
?). As a consequence, consistency checks using at least two of these approaches may reinforce 
the validity of empirical findings. 
 
 
4.3 Happiness and causality 
 
It is not success that make people happy but happiness that makes people successful 
Alfred Schweitzer 
 
The  problem  of  biunivocal  causality  and  endogeneity  is  particularly  severe  in  happiness 
studies.  Beyond  age  (but  not  longevity),  there  are  plausible  assumptions  for  justifying 
theoretically both direct and reverse causality links for almost all other factors correlated with 
life satisfaction.  
To make just an example the usually observed positive relationship between marriage and 
life satisfaction may depend from the positive effect generated by the marital status on life 
satisfaction or may otherwise imply that individuals with more pro-social inherited traits and 
a more positive view of life have higher probability to find a stable partner. In the same way, 




common unobserved individual traits (assertiveness, optimism, hope in the future) which 
positively  affect  both  life  satisfaction  and  professional  success  in  life  leading  to  higher 
income. 
Controlling  for  fixed  effects  is  however  not  sufficient  to  capture  reverse  causality.  Fixed 
effects  proxy  time  invariant  idiosyncratic  personal  characteristics  but  cannot  capture 
endogeneity between changes of the regressor and the dependent variable, that is, situations 
in  which  variation  in  happiness  within  individuals  across  time  affect  potential  happiness 
determinants  and  not  viceversa.  This  is  for  instance  the  typical  case  of  relational  goods 
(section 3.1). Our basic mood may vary across life periods and such variation is highly likely 
to be associated to a different propensity to meet friends and to participate to social activities.  
The identification of the correct causality nexus is a fundamental question when we want to 
draw policy conclusions from the observed empirical findings. More specifically, as it is well 
known, policy measures aimed at affecting a given happiness driver may be effective only in 
case of direct causality link. The point is underlined also by Clark et al. (2006) recommending 
caution in drawing policy recommendations from studies on happiness and unemployment, 
since  the    part  of  the  measured  effect  which  is  expression  of  an  inverse  causality  nexus 
(individuals  with  lower  life  satisfaction,  or  prone  to  pessimism,  have  relatively  higher 
difficulties in finding a job), can hardly be tackled by active labour policies.  
To  apply  this  reasoning  to  the  relational  goods  example  as  a  politician  I  may  increase 
wellbeing  with  policies  which  make  it  easier  the  creation  of  relational  goods  if  a  higher 
frequency, intensity or quality of the latter affect life satisfaction but my  strategy will be 
totally ineffective if only the reverse link exists or an exogenous dynamics of people mood 
(which  the  politician  cannot  affect)  univocally  determines  the  fruition  and  enjoyment  of 
relational goods. 29 
As  in  other  economic  subfields,  causality  problems  may  be  solved  by  randomized  field, 
laboratory  or  quasi-natural  experiments.  Lab  experiments  have  the  advantage  of 
reproducibility30 and capacity to isolate, ceteris paribus and  with a specific treatment, the 
change of the variable whose impact on our target indicator we want to test. Their main limit 
is  the  reduced  external  consistency,  or  the  lack  of  perfect  correspondence  between  the 
artificial events produced in the laboratory and what happens in the reality of economic life. 
Since most lab experiments are run on the population of students with limited monetary 
incentives and the possibility of creating experiments with repeated action is limited by costs, 
experimental researchers  have generally no guarantee that  the observed behaviour would 
correspond to that of the actual population in real life choices  where  the  experimental 
situation under scrutiny is continuously repeated in time.  
This is why what is generally preferred is a situation  not determined by an ―artificial shock‖ 
created in the laboratory but by an exogenous shock generated by an historic event. In such 
case the exogeneity of the shock should eliminate the suspicion of reverse causality, so that 
                                                 
29 The extreme generalized case in which policies are completely useless is that of the set point theory (Costa et al., 
1987; Cummins et al., 2004) which states that any positive change in income (as of any other event in life) has no 
permanent effects on happiness, the latter being uniquely determined by individual temperament.  
30 Reproducibility is important since it allows to overcome another potential problem of experiments, that is, 
whether their results can be generalized or not when the same ex perimental protocol is applied to different 




the  relationship  between  the  exogenous  variation  and  that  of  the  target  variable  can  be 
interpreted univocally.   
Few interesting natural experiments in happiness studies have been performed to verify the 
causal nexus between money and happiness. From this point of view, as briefly mentioned 
before, Gardner and Oswald (2006) look at lottery wins, Frijters et al. (2004a, 2004b and 2006) 
consider  aggregate  changes  in  real  income  after  transition  or  reunification  in  Russia  and 
Germany respectively, while Becchetti and Castriota (2010) look at the effect of the Tsunami 
as a ―negative lottery‖ by comparing changes in income and in life satisfaction for individuals 
hit  by  the  calamity  and  those  living  at  few  kilometres  from  them  who  were  not  directly 
affected by the natural catastrophe. 
Consider that in second and third example of studies, differently from the first, a distinctive 
advantage is in the absence of voluntary participation bias (that is, individuals who were hit 
by the shock did not made any voluntary choice which affected their probability of living 
such event since they did not buy any lottery ticket).  
The more traditional alternative to experiments is given by the identification of relevant and 
valid  instruments,  that  is,  of  instruments  which  are  significantly  correlated  with  the 
endogenous instrumented variable but are such that there is no correlation between them and 
the error term of the structural regression (which, in turn, implies no direct causation from 
the instrument to the dependent variable and absence of omitted factors affecting both). It is 
not easy to find instruments having the two properties (relevance and validity) together given 
the trade-off between them. 
An example of the instrumental approach applied to life satisfaction studies may be retrieved 
in Becchetti, Giachin and Pelloni (2009) who use the share of retired people in a given gender 
specific age cohort as an instrument for relational goods. Such variable, indicates a higher 
availability of peers with more leisure time available and proves to be relevant and correlated 
with the instrumented variable. The instrument is also valid since it is  shown not to affect, 
per se the dependent variable and not suspect of reverse causation.  
A  final  interesting  alternative  approach  is  the  discontinuity  design.31    Such 
methodology  can be implemented  when the beneficiaries/non-beneficiaries of a treatment 
can be ordered along a quantifiable dimension and the latter can be used to compute a well-
defined index or parameter. The crucial point is that the index/parameter must have a cut-off 
point for eligibility and must be what decides the assignment of a potential beneficiary to the 
treatment (or to non-treatment). 
The main intuition of this approach is that, around the cut -off point, treatment and control 
sample individuals must be very similar to each other. Discontinuity designs may be sharp or 
fuzzy. They are sharp when a unique cut off univocally divides  treatment from control 
sample. They are fuzzy when the discontinuity may be correlated with the treatment and the 
cut off is not univocal. 
                                                 
31 For a theoretical treatment see van der Klaauw et al. (2001). For other prominent examples of this approach, 
see, among others, Angrist and Levy (1999), van der Klaauw (2002), Jacob and Lefgren (2004), or Ludwig and 




In  the  application  to  the  retirement  instrument,  more  formally,  if  retirement  was 
entirely exogenous and fixed at 60 for all individuals, the following standard specification 
could be used  for a sharp discontinuity design 
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Where  LSit  is life  satisfaction   of the i-th individual at time  t,  Retage  is an  age threshold 
common to every individual (i.e. 60) and the regression includes usual controls, age and time 
dummies. In this case, the test on the significance of the treatment would be based on the 
significance of the θ coefficient. 
However, since large part of retirement decisions are voluntary and not concentrated 
at 60 (but agglomerated around 60-63 years), retirement age is partly endogenous and it may 
be, in turn, correlated with its effects on happiness. What therefore needs to be done is to 
devise a ―fuzzy‖ discontinuity design in which the treatment is instrumented with the age-
retirement function f(RA). The function takes the value of the share of retired individuals in 
the  population  for  each  individual  age  observation.  It  cannot  be  affected  by  a  single 
individual and has the advantage of being uncorrelated with age dummies. As a consequence 
the estimate  should be 
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where  f(RA)  is  the  retirement  age  function.  To  avoid  that  the  function  captures  also  the 
retirement effects not related to the relational good effects, the retirement dummy needs to be 




4.5 How happiness can help to measure the unmeasurable 
 
One of the most interesting applications of happiness studies is given by the opportunity they 
give to calculate shadow values of non market goods. The main contributions in this field are 
those valuing air pollution (Welsch, 2002 and Luechinger, 2007), terrorist activity (Frey et al., 
2009), noise nuisance (van Praag and Baarsma, 2005) and flood disasters (Luechinger and 
Raschky, 2009). 
The  approach  followed  by  these  authors  is  that  of  calculating  the  compensating  surplus 
(henceforth also CS) of a given variable for the individual i measured as: 
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where α2 is the coefficient of the given non market variable and α1 is the coefficient of income. 
The main limit of this approach is that  (as shown by most empirical evidence) monetary 
compensations have a greater effect on subjective wellbeing for individuals with lower levels 
(and higher marginal utility) of income (Diener and Seligman, 2004; Fahey and Smyth, 2004). 
Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) correctly observe that this fact has the politically problematic 
implication  that  compensation  for  an  attribute  which  is  detrimental  to  happiness  will  be 
greater for those with higher incomes (and lower marginal utility of it). The problem becomes 




some cases, not significant (Wildman and Jones, 2002) or even negative (Clark 2003, Clark 
and Oswald, 1994). 
 
 It  is  evident  that,  in  spite  of  these  limitations,  the  approach  may  be  preferred  to  the 
alternative  of    contingent  evaluation.  As  Carson  and  Mitchel  (1989)  and  Diamond  and 
Hausman  (1994)  correctly  argue,  direct  questions  on  the  willingness  to  pay  for  a  given 
attribute are much more likely to be biased. A first bias is determined by the fact that the 
respondent knows that his response may affect the decision on the quantity of a public good 
or service provided. A second bias is related to limits  in the computational abilities of the 
respondents when the scenario presented by the interviewed is too far from reality. A third 
bias (embedding effect) arises when observing that in  many empirical results quantitative 
responses tend to be strikingly similar despite of the different situations presented within the 
same  scenario.  The  interpretation  is  that  respondents  have  a  clear  idea  of  their  general 
willingness  to  pay  for  a  given  good,  but  not on  its  exact  amount  and  on  its  elasticity  to 
changes in the side conditions prospected in the hypothetical demands. A  fourth problem is 
that  respondents  may  tend  to  please  the  interviewer.  This  creates  an  upward  bias  on 
willingness to pay findings.  
With the life satisfaction approach none of this biases applies: there is no direct elicitation of 
the willingness to pay for the specific attribute under scrutiny (and no complex valuation 
effort  required)  since  the  shadow  value  is  calculated  indirectly  with  coefficients  of  life 
satisfaction  estimates.  Therefore  the  respondent  cannot  be  aware  of  the  intention  of  the 




5. Happiness, indicators and economic policies  
 
As it may be well understood from the starting point of our survey (the discussion of the 
Easterlin paradox), one of the main motivations of happiness studies is the desire to interpret 
the  anomalies  in  the  relationship  between  monetary  wellbeing  and  life  satisfaction.  The 
implicit assumption of economists has been often that the increase of economic value created 
coincides with the broader concept of wellbeing (or, otherwise said, that it was not up to 
economists to care about negative side consequences in other dimensions arising from the 
maximisation of such goal). Unfortunately, the separation of social disciplines, if it may help 
to  concentrate  the  focus  in  the  realm  of  positive  economics,  has  definitely  no  sense  in 
normative  economics.  Since  economic  decisions  have  consequences  on  all  dimensions  of 
human life, it is meaningless to propose policy solutions without considering in full their 
social  and  environmental  externalities.  More  specifically,  economists  may  also  investigate 
only the specific economic effect of a given policy action but cannot draw from it an ultimate 
indication on the validity of such action without considering also the non economic effects of 
it. 
The most typical example in the above mentioned problem generated by the ―Babel tower‖ of 




environmentalists  which  has  gone  on  for  a  long  time.  The  first  focus  on  the  problem  of 
poverty and creation of economic value  and suggest  that  one of the main solutions is to 
stimulate aggregate consumption and foster economic growth. The second concentrate on the 
problem  of  environmental  degradation  and  suggest  the  opposite  since  a  reduction  of 
consumption would bring with it a reduction of polluting emissions, less depletion of natural 
resources and a reduction of the ―ecological footprint‖ (Wackernagel and Rees, 1996).  
The life satisfaction approach goes beyond the separation  among disciplines and requires 
understanding of psychology, sociology, environmental sciences if we want to understand 
and interpret the consequences of economic action on individual life satisfaction.   
Life satisfaction studies overcome such separation since economic, psychological (i.e. hedonic 
adaptation) and sociological (i.e. role of peers and relative income) factors jointly concur in 
affecting  subjective  wellbeing.  They  may  therefore  make  our  policies  more  efficient  in 
pursuing  societal  wellbeing  by  integrating  perspectives  from  different  disciplines  and  
demonstrating  the  importance  of  interpersonal  relationships,  identifying  trade-offs  and 
crowding out effects between monetary and non monetary factors, calculating the value of 
many non market goods in terms of our wellbeing, evaluating the relative weight between 
two different economic variables in terms of happiness. 
Results from empirical studies on this field have contributed to give empirical support to the 
construction of a new set of indicators to be used for measuring progress in economically and 
environmentally sustainable wellbeing. 
In this perspective one of the results of happiness studies has been that of demonstrating the 
need of looking at a wider set of indicators to measure societal progress an human wellbeing. 
Since  most  of  these  indicators  already  exists  the  true  problem  is  the  emphasis  given  by 
economists, policymakers and the press to them. If this is the direction for the future, it is not 
however advisable to move to the extreme  of maximising self declared life satisfaction. This 
indicator is in fact subject to bias and it would even more so if interviewed individuals would 
know that it becomes the crucial indicator for economic policies. Furthermore, if subjective 
wellbeing may tell us whether fundamental dimensions of the human being are neglected by 
standard economic approaches, the same measure tends in some cases to overstate personal 
needs without regard for their compatibility with socioenvironmental equilibria. To make an 
example  if  we  would  rely  on  the  direct  effect  of  climate  change  on  individual  wellbeing 
(without  considering  its  indirect  side  effects  on  health  and  global  warming)  we  should 
conclude that nothing needs to be done against it since most people (especially those living in 
cold and temperate areas) generally like to have warmer temperatures and more sunny days. 
Another  caveat  on  the  straightforward  use  of  life  satisfaction  indicators  for  measuring 
wellbeing comes from the ―happy slave paradox‖ (Sen, 2005) where it is correctly argued that 
happiness studies must not fall into the trap of considering subjective happiness as the only 
criterion,  with  the  serious  risk  of  implicitly  legitimating  exploitation  and  poor  living 
conditions in those cases in which they lead to adaptation of the human being to misery. 
 
The right direction to take is therefore that of considering a wider set of existing indicators 
which help us to understand whether policies are correctly pursuing the target of creating 
economic  value  in  a  socially  and  environmentally  sustainable  way  or,  better  and  slightly 




maximisation of individual wellbeing under the constraints of environmental sustainability 
and the necessary creation of economic value. 
Having said that, another daunting methodological problem we face along this path is in the 
challenge of defining a composite indicator which takes properly and parsimoniously into 
account  all these  dimensions. Since  at the moment there are no objective  and universally 
accepted  rules  to  weight  individual  indicators  in  the  aggregate  index,  the  most  honest 
approach is that of declaring one‘s own weights and of showing the dynamics of the simple 
indicators. In the same way we know that, for our safety when driving a car, we must not 
look only at the speed but also to all other signals related to brake, oil, water conditions and 
we do so looking at each information separately and not by aggregating it in a superindex of 
car conditions.  
To provide an example on how also in the recent past international institutions were already 
taking into account in their report this issue, the  2003 World Bank Report describes societal 
wellbeing in a picture in which, together with the central part of the diagram which considers 
the typical economic measures (production, consumption and growth), the two left and right 
sides  of  it  include  social  and  environmental  factors  which  are  considered  in  their  dual 
function of being production factors and contributing per se to individual wellbeing.  
What probably has to be reinforced in this scheme, and also in the economic research, is the 
emphasis  on  how  good  quality  relationships  may  be  the  infrastructure  which  helps  to 
produce  more  interpersonal  trust  and  social  capital,  two  crucial  resources  for  economic 
prosperity and the fundament for all economic relationships in a framework of asymmetric 
information and incomplete contracts. The paradox, well illustrated in some games (public 
good game, prisoner‘s dilemma, traveller‘s dilemma and investment game)   which mimic 
crucial and recurring aspects of economic life, is that good relationships, cooperation and 
team  working  often  generate  Pareto  superior  results  with  respect  to  the  traditional 
individualist approach following Nash rationality (Mc Cabe et al., 2003; Basu, 1994).  
To  conclude  with,  politicians  would  better  not  neglect  what  comes  out  from  happiness 
studies  in  order  to  understand  the  deeper  motivations  of  human  economic  actions, 
productivity and entrepreneurship. Policy measures designed with the aim of maximising 
output  growth,  which  do  not  consider  their  eventual  unintended  consequences  on  non 
monetary factors affecting individual wellbeing, can achieve their primary goal of economic 
growth (even though they may have even problems on it due to the above mentioned game 
theoretic  cooperative  paradoxes)  but  seriously  risk  of  missing  the  target  of  consolidating 
political  consensus  if  indirect  negative  effects  on  happiness  more  than  compensate  the 
benefits of a more affluent society.  
 
 
5.1 An  application of  happiness methodology to  macroeconomic policies: the inflation-
unemployment trade-off revisited  
 
Beyond  the  more  general  reasoning  developed  in  the  previous  sections  one  of  the  main 
applications of happiness studies on economic policies concerns studies on the relationship 




Unemployment and inflation are two crucial indicators for the evaluation of the effectiveness 
of economic policies so that a typical measure of the performance of the latter can be  based 
on composite indicators which arbitrarily assign certain weights to the two bads. One of the 
most famous is the rule of thumb of the ―Misery Index‖ which calculates countries‘  well 
being levels with a simple unweighted sum of the unemployment and inflation rates. The 
implicit (and strong) assumption is that a one percent rise of inflation and unemployment 
generate the same welfare loss.  
 
Di Tella et al. (2001 and 2003) revisit this issue by using the life satisfaction approach and  
show that the Misery Index underestimates the relative cost of unemployment. Their source is 
the Eurobarometer Survey containing information on self reported life satisfaction of more 
than 634,000 individuals from 1975 to 2002. 
The authors follow a two stage approach. In the first stage they regress the self-declared level 
of life-satisfaction on a set of personal characteristics, year and country dummies and a time 
trend. They then calculate the country-year average prediction error from the first stage and 
obtain an (unbalanced) panel of ―unexplained‖ satisfactions where every country has one 
observation per year. In the second stage they regress this newly created variable on the 
three-year moving average inflation and unemployment rates, year and country dummies 




nijt n ijt ijt ijt X U H                          (4) 
 
where Hijt is the happiness level in the period t of the individual i living in country j, U is a 
dummy variable which takes value 1 if the individual is unemployed and 0 otherwise and Xn 
the n-th control variable in the individual happiness estimates. Country unemployment and 
inflation rates are obviously excluded from the Xnjt controls. In the second stage they estimate 




mjt m jt jt jt jt v Y u                           (5) 
where  jt    is  the  average  unexplained  residual  for  country  j  at  time  t  from  the  first  stage 
individual  happiness  equation,  π  and  u  are  the  three-year  moving-average  inflation  and 
unemployment rates, Ym is the m-th control variable (e.g. lagged levels of unemployment and 
inflation and current and lagged levels of GDP). 
 
 
On the basis of results from these estimates the authors calculate a Trade-Off Index (TOI) 
which expresses the ratio between the social cost of a one percent change in unemployment 
and the social cost of a one percent change in  inflation as 32 
                                                 
32  This  choice  is  preferred  to  the  alternative  of  weighting  the  first  coefficient  at  the  numerator  for  the 
unemployment rate, which would make the index no longer a marginal rate of substitution and dependent on 











        (6)
 
where  γ  is  the  regression  coefficient  of  unemployed  individuals  in  the  first  stage  life 
satisfaction  estimate,    while  φ  and  and  ψ  are  respectively  the  coefficient  of    the  
unemployment and the inflation rate in the second stage regression. 
 
With their two stage approach the authors demonstrate that policymakers should trade off a 
one percent reduction in unemployment with a 1.66 percent increase of inflation in order to 
maintain constant the level of welfare. This finding contradicts the Misery Index hypothesis 
that the two ―bads‖ (measured in percent values) have to be considered as perfect substitutes.  
 
A main point of the paper is that the cost of unemployment is higher also because it does not 
affect only unemployed individuals. In fact, the cost of unemployment is given by the sum of 
two  components:  the  psychological  cost  of  being  unemployed  (which  affects  only  jobless 
individuals participating to the labour market) and the effects of the unemployment rate on 
employed individuals (which affect all the remaining population worried about contagion of 
the disease or emotionally involved in unemployment of some friends or relatives).  
 
Becchetti,  Castriota  and  Giuntella  (2009)  extend  these  results  in  two  directions  by  testing 
whether the inflation/unemployment trade-off changes according to age  and the degree of 
employment protection in different countries. Using the same database for an extended time 
period  (Eurobarometer  Survey,  1975-2002)  they  document  that  the  relative  cost  of 
unemployment versus inflation is markedly higher in central age classes and in countries 
with  lower  employment  protection  (EPL).  The  last  result  is  consistent  with  the  relatively 
higher probability of loosing a job in such countries but more puzzling if we think also of the 
higher probability of finding a new job when unemployed. Potential explanations for  the 
puzzle are habituation effects (Winkelmann & Winkelmann, 1998 and Clark, Georgellis and 
Sanfis, 2001) among the relatively higher share of long term unemployed, stronger informal 
economies in high job protection countries, and the role of social norms. 
  
An intriguing question is about the relationship between individual preferences, labor market 
rules and central bank behaviour. 
More  specifically,  the  authors  wonder  whether  the  different  behaviors  of  economic 
institutions in the US, UK and continental Western Europe may be partly explained by the 
differing  worries  about  unemployment  observed  among  citizens  –  even  though  the 
differences which emerge when comparing, for instance, the main targets declared in the 
statutes of the ECB and the Federal Reserve are not always supported by robust empirical 




With  regard  to  such  differences  it  can  be  observed  that  the  EU  found  consensus  for  the 
creation of an independent Central Bank with a clear anti-inflationary stance33 and no explicit 
consideration of an unemployment target.  34 By contrast, the statute of the Federal Reserve 
lists six main monetary policy objectives, does not fix any clear inflation target, and asserts 
that  monetary  policy  should  both  sustain  economic  growth  and  fight  price  increases.35 
Central Banks aside, it has to be noted that the UK government has based its decision not to 
enter the EMU also on the fear that it would not be possible to pursue an active independent 
employment policy.36 
This interpretation is only one among the several considered in the literature to  explain the 
different behaviours of the two Central Banks. Sahuc and Smets (2008) refer to it when they 
write that  ―the explicit dual  mandate  of  the Federal  Reserve  may lead to  a larger  weight on  the 
stabilization of output around its sustainable path and a stronger response to developments in the 
output gap. This could in turn explain why policy rates move more strongly in response to the business 
cycle.” 
These authors provide two additional explanations, however. First, the size, composition and 
voting mechanisms of the two CBs may determine differences in the speed of reactions to 
shocks. Second,  economies and shocks are markedly different in the two areas.37 Without 
                                                 
33 Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of European Central Bank. Objectives and tasks of 
the ECB (1992). Article 2: “In accordance with Article 105(1) of this Treaty, the primary objective of the 
ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support the 
general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of 
the Community as laid down in Article 2 of this Treaty. The ESCB shall act in accordance with the principle of 
an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in compliance 
with the principles set out in Article 4 of this Treaty.‖ 
34  De  Grauwe  (2005)  cites  two  main  reasons  for  the  ECB‘s  approach,  which  he  considers  relatively  more 
conservative and concerned about inflation. The first is the emphasis placed in the 1980s on the central bank‘s 
independence (Barro-Gordon, 1984) and the call for a more conservative central banker (see Rogoff, 1985). The 
second is the role played by Germany in shaping the EMU and the Eurosystem. 
35 Federal Reserve Act (1913), Section 2A - Monetary Policy Objectives: ―The Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System and the Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and 
creditaggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to promote 
effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.‖ 
 
36 Gordon Brown, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, in 1997 set out five economic tests on which any decision 
about UK membership of the EMU should be based: i)  Cyclical convergence: are business cycles  and economic 
structures compatible so that we and others could live comfortably with euro interest rates on a permanent 
basis?; ii) Flexibility: if problems emerge is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?; iii) Investment: would 
joining EMU create better conditions for firms making longterm decisions to invest in Britain?; iv) Financial  
services: what impact would entry into EMU have on the competitive position of the UK's financial services 
industry, particularly the City's wholesale markets?; v) Employment and growth: in summary, will joining EMU 
promote higher growth, stability and a  lasting increase in jobs? The Executive HM Treasury Report (1997) 
concluded as follows: ―We need to demonstrate sustainable and durable convergence before we can be sure that 
British membership of EMU would be good for growth and jobs. Joining before such convergence is secured 
would risk harming both‖. 
37 More specifically, if the interest rate sensitivity in the United States of various demand components is different 
from that in the Euro area, this will affect the size of the interest rate changes required to maintain price stability, 
even in face of similar shocks.  Furthermore, the euro area economy may be more rigid in presence of economic 




ignoring the relevance and validity of these two additional explanations, the considerations 
provided above may be helpful for checking whether the statutory differences between the 
two CBs are consistent with data on differences in inflation and unemployment costs in terms 





At the beginning of the third millennium the globalised world faces a three-sided problem. 
First,  borrowing  an  expression  from  a  recent  international  campaign,  in  spite  of  our 
extraordinary technological advances which made it possible the survival of a much larger 
population than in the pre-industrial evolution era we did not succeed in  ―making poverty 
history‖ and  the ―bottom billion‖ of the world population is still estimated to live in extreme 
poverty and below the symbolic poverty line thresholds. Second, while trying to create more 
economic value (or to redistribute it better) in order to improve conditions of the poor we face 
at  the  same  the  time  the  challenge  of  global  warning  and  of  the  negative  environmental 
externalities generated by current production systems. Last but not least,  evidence like that 
of the Easterlin paradox but also of other indicators such as the increasing consumption of 
antidepressive pills in high income countries, make economists aware that economic growth 
does not necessarily coincide with improvement of human wellbeing and especially so at 
already high levels of per capita income. 
In this framework the life satisfaction literature, without having the presumption of replacing 
existing wellbeing indicators with self declared happiness, may bring important elements of 
reflections.  
First of all it suggests us, together with the increasing number of results in revealed choices 
and  lab  experiments,  to  depart  from  the  anthropological  reductionism  of  the  fully  self-
interested  rational  paradigm,  evidencing  the  important  role  played  by  sympathy, 
commitment, reciprocity, inequity aversion in our experience and choice utility. Second, it 
helps policymakers to understand the ranking of human priorities.   
 
Did we need the additional contribution of life satisfaction studies if we already had powerful 
concepts such as functionings and capabilities ? Yes we did.  
The capability approach often implies the goal of the enlargement of the frontiers of human 
possibilities implicitly suggesting that such goal coincides with the increase of aggregate life 
satisfaction. Results from the empirical happiness literature and the life satisfaction approach 
bring an important distinction on this often valid principle. What really makes life satisfaction 
is not the extension of opportunities but a choice criterion which helps us to discern among 
different possibilities by understanding our progressively evolving set of preferences and the 
link of them with our deep satisfaction. The life satisfaction literature says that we can get lost 
                                                                                                                                                                         
and source of the shocks hitting both economies are different (this is particularly evident when we compare 
productivity growth in the two areas). To sum up, if economic structures and sensitivity to shocks are different, 




in  the  jungle  of  possibilities  and  confuse  consumption  goods  and  relational  goods.  Since 
marginal utility is generally decreasing for the former and increasing (or non decreasing) for 
the latter, this  may lead us to confuse constraints with liaisons. Some of the results discussed 
above may be the result of the mistake of interpreting all what makes life happy with the 
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